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1. Introduction 
Since the global financial crisis there has been a surge in interest in the work of Hyman Minsky and 
his Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH). Even the financial press (Financial Times Alphaville 
20/8/2007),1 the key economic policy institutions (White, 2009; IMF, 2012) and the mainstream 
economics literature (e.g. Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012 and Bhattacharaya et al., 2015) refer to 
Minsky respectfully. However, there is a literature on modelling Minsky’s FIH within the field of 
heterodox economics that has been largely ignored by this interest in Minsky. The aim of this paper 
is to offer a survey of this literature. 
Minsky’s financial theory of economic crises explains how periods of tranquil growth lead to more 
financially fragile structures and speculative booms that can result in deep recessions and instability 
(Minsky, 1975, 1982, 1986 [2008]). In Minsky’s theoretical framework financial fragility increases due 
to endogenous forces that are linked with institutional transformations and the willingness of firms 
and banks to adopt riskier financial practices because of lower perceived uncertainty. Financial 
markets play also an important role in the generation of booms and busts since asset prices affect 
investment and debt relationships. There are at least four key features in Minsky’s theory that have 
been extensively used in the Minskyan models so far. First, the debt ratio of firms tends to increase 
during the economic boom. Minsky expressed this over-indebtedness via his categorisation of firms 
into hedge, speculative and Ponzi ones. His FIH suggests that during periods of tranquillity firms 
gradually shift from hedge to speculative or Ponzi regimes and the financial fragility becomes higher. 
Second, stock market prices, which tend to increase during economic expansions, have a positive 
impact on economic activity via his ‘two price’ theory of investment. Third, the accumulation of debt 
has generally a negative impact of economic activity. However, this negative impact might take time 
to materialise because the rise in indebtedness is accompanied by (i) asset price inflation that boosts 
investment and (ii) a decline in the desired margins of safety of banks and firms that increases credit 
expansion. Fourth, one of the reasons why economic booms come to an end is the rise in the 
interest rate that comes from commercial banks’ response to the rising indebtedness of borrowers 
or from central bank’s policy that leads to an increase in interest rates during economic booms. 
Minsky’s writings are rich and innovative, but lack analytical clarity. Since the mid 1980s there has 
been a growing number of papers that have tried to give a formal representation of Minsky’s 
arguments. While all Minskyan models share that the financial variables play an important role in 
generating business cycles or instability, a closer examination reveals substantial differences in the 
mechanisms involved in the models as well as their dynamic properties. The aim of this paper is to 
survey the literature and identify differences and similarities in the mechanisms that give rise to 
business cycles or instability. We suggest a structure to classify Minsky-inspired models. We will use 
the term Minsky model for macroeconomic models that analyse the dynamic interaction between 
real and financial variables, build on Minsky and model some of the mechanisms he highlighted. We 
will distinguish between models that focus on debt or interest dynamics and models in which asset 
price dynamics play a key role. In the first type of models the source of the dynamics is in the 
interaction of the goods market with the financial market and the key variable is the debt ratio or 
the interest rate. Within this category of models we make a classification between (i) the Kalecki-
Minsky models that assume a stable goods market, (ii) the Kaldor-Minsky models which postulate 
                                                          
1 https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2007/08/20/6687/economist-idol-minskys-new-found-fame/  
3 
 
instability in the goods market, (iii) the Goodwin-Minsky models that incorporate debt dynamics into 
the traditional Goodwin interactions between the wage share and employment rate, (iv) the credit 
rationing Minsky models which consider explicitly credit rationing and the role that banks’ financial 
position play in the provision of loans, (v) the endogenous target debt ratio Minsky models in which 
the accumulation of debt is driven by the stock-flow norms of the private sector that change 
endogenously during the economic cycle and (vi) the Minsky-Veblen models that combine consumer 
debt with the Veblenian ideas of emulation motives. Within the asset price dynamics models, we 
distinguish between (i) the equity price Minsky models that analyse the cycles and the instability 
that arise from the dynamics of equity prices and (ii) the real estate price Minsky models that study 
the dynamic interaction between mortgages and housing prices.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Minsky models and 
describes our suggested classification. Section 3 analyses the details of the Minsky models that 
concentrate on the debt or interest dynamics. Section 4 scrutinises the Minsky models in which asset 
prices play a key role. Section 5 discusses mainstream models that have incorporated Minskyan 
ideas. Section 6 summarises the key differences between the families of Minsky models, outlines 
their key limitations and briefly identifies directions for future research. 
 
2. Overview and structure of Minsky models 
There are several dimensions along which there are differences in the Minskyan models. Key 
differences include: Is the aim of the model to demonstrate the instability of the system or the 
emergence of endogenous cycles? Is the main source of instability in the interaction of the goods 
market and financial markets or is the source of the instability the financial sector itself? Is the key 
financial variable debt, the interest rate or asset prices? Does the interest rate change because of a 
change in portfolio decision, the behaviour of commercial banks or the policy of the central bank? 
What is the residual source of finance? Do banks ration credit?  
We will refer to Minsky model when authors positively refer to Minsky and offer a formal 
macroeconomic model in which there are causally related cycles in financial markets and real 
markets or unstable interactions between the two. Figure 1 summarises our suggested structure of 
Minsky models. Our broad distinction relies on whether the source of cyclical dynamics and 
instability is in the interaction between the goods markets and the financial market, with debt or 
interest rate dynamics being central, or whether it is primarily in the financial markets itself, with 
asset prices playing the key role. The relevant financial market in the traditional Minsky models is 
the equity market. However, there are also some Minsky models that pay particular attention to the 
interaction between housing price and mortgages despite the fact that housing prices are not 
considered an integral part of Minsky’s analysis.  
< Figure 1> 
The Kalecki-Minsky models constitute the first group of debt or interest dynamics models. Here the 
output is demand determined, the standard Keynesian stability condition on the goods market holds 
(marginal propensity to save is larger than the marginal propensity to invest) while asset prices and 
household debt are assumed away. In these models the debt-to-capital ratio is used as an indicator 
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of financial fragility. Also, many of these models (e.g. Lima and Meirelles, 2007; Nishi, 2012; Sasaki 
and Fujita, 2012) measure the financial fragility of firms by using Minsky’s classification of hedge, 
speculative and Ponzi finance regimes based on the relationship between investment expenditures, 
profits and interest payments.2 In the majority of the Kalecki-Minsky models the interest rate is 
endogenous. The interest rates are set by commercial banks which increase in response to the rising 
debt-to-capital ratios of their costumers (e.g. Charles, 2008) or because of increasing economic 
activity (e.g. Lima and Meirelles, 2007). The labour market is not explicitly analysed in the Kalecki-
Minsky models (an exception is Fazzari et al., 2008).  
The second group within the debt or interest dynamics models are the Kaldor-Minsky models. Kaldor 
(1940) proposed a model where the goods market is overshooting because of strong accelerator 
effects.3 While in Kaldor and other related literature investment levels out at some point because of 
real constraints (e.g. supply side bottle necks), the Kaldor-Minsky model “is made unstable by a 
strong investment accelerator, but the instability is contained by financial forces” (Foley, 1987, p. 
364). In most Kaldor-Minsky models the interest rate is endogenous (e.g. Foley, 1987). However, 
there are also models in which the interest rate is exogenous (e.g. Skott, 1994). 
The third group is the Goodwin-Minsky models. Goodwin (1967) examined the cycles that can be 
generated by the interaction of wage share and employment rate. In his framework the Say’s law 
holds and output is determined by capital stock. In the Goodwin-Minsky models debt is introduced 
via an investment function and interest payments squeeze profits and investment in the same way 
that wages do in the Goodwin model. A key difference of the Goodwin-Minsky models from the 
Kalecki-Minsky and the Kaldor-Minsky models is that labour market plays a central role via the 
Marxian idea of the reserve army of labour.  
The fourth group is the credit rationing Minsky models. In contrast to the previous models, banks in 
these models apply credit rationing explicitly and this credit rationing is affected by banks’ financial 
position. Credit rationing refers either to the volume of credit that is supplied by banks (Ryoo, 
2013b; Nikolaidi, 2014) or to the interest rate that is charged by banks which in turn affects the 
amount of credit (Delli Gatti et al., 2005, 2010). In these models the interaction between the 
financial position of firms and the financial position of banks plays a central role in the emergence of 
cycles and instability. 
The fifth group is the endogenous target debt ratio Minsky models (Dafermos, 2017; Jump et al., 
2017). In these models the expenditures of the private sector and the dynamics of debt are affected 
by stock-flow norms (target debt ratios). These stock-flow norms change endogenously based on the 
Minskyan argument that the perception of risk alters during the economic cycle: in a period of 
tranquil or high growth firms, or the private sector in general, increase their target of debt; the 
opposite is true during period of low or volatile growth. This endogeneity of the target debt ratios is 
conducive to cycles and instability. 
                                                          
2 Foley (2003) was the first one who incorporated the hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance regime 
classification into an open economy macro model. This classification has also been incorporated into agent-
based models (see e.g. Delli Gatti et al., 2003; Chiarella and Di Guilmi, 2011). 
3 The choice of labels for our families is somewhat arbitrary. In particular, Kaldor (1940, p. 78) notes that his 
model is very similar to an earlier paper by Kalecki (1937). We think our labels are reasonably accurate as most 
Kaleckian models assume or imply stable goods markets (e.g. Lavoie, 2014). 
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The sixth group is the Minsky-Veblen models. Applying Veblen’s (1899 [1970]) ideas about the 
impact of social conventions on consumption, the Minsky-Veblen models assume that low-income 
households take on consumer debt in order to increase their consumption expenditures and 
emulate the high-income households (Kapeller and Schütz, 2014; Ryoo and Kim, 2014; Kapeller et 
al., 2016). In these models the credit provision is affected by households’ balance sheet, which 
implies that there is credit rationing. The interest rate can be either endogenous or exogenous. 
Cycles arise because banks are willing to provide credit to low-income households when their 
indebtedness is low, but reduce credit availability once households’ interest payments have become 
sufficiently high.  
Within the group of asset price dynamics models the first type is the equity price Minsky models. In 
these models households invest in different financial assets, including equities, and their portfolio 
choice affects the equity price dynamics. The expected rate of return on equity plays a key role in 
generating instability or endogenous cycles (see e.g. Taylor and O’Connell, 1985; Ryoo 2010, 2013a; 
Chiarella and Di Guilmi, 2011). When the expected rate of return increases, the price of equities goes 
up and this affects positively economic activity via investment and/or consumption. The second type 
of asset price models are the real estate price Minsky models. These models have been motivated by 
the global financial crisis and focus on the role of housing prices in the emergence of instability and 
cycles (Ryoo, 2016). House prices affect the provision of mortgages (since houses are used as 
collateral in the debt contracts). As mortgages increase, the demand for houses increases leading to 
further increases in the price of houses. As in the Minsky-Veblen models, the boom stops because of 
the rise in household indebtedness. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the various features of the models covered in this survey. These 
features include (i) the overshooting, or not, of the goods market with respect to demand shocks, (ii) 
the existence of a Keynesian or a non-Keynesian goods market, (iii) the incorporation of household 
debt or corporate debt, (iv) the inclusion, or not, of equity or real estate prices, (v) the explicit 
incorporation, or not, of credit rationing, (vi) the inclusion, or not, of the effects of firms’ or 
households’ bankruptcy; (vii) the examination, or not, of the effects of the labour market, (viii) the 
inclusion, or not, of the distinction between hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance regimes, (ix) the 
inclusion of an endogenous or exogenous interest rate, (x) the incorporation, or not, of endogenous 
stock-flow norms and (xi) the formalisation, or not, of the stability effects of financial regulation and 
fiscal policy.  
Table 1 shows that the models also differ in the type of analytical framework that they use and the 
dynamic analysis that they conduct. Most Minsky models are small structural models with 2 or 3 
dynamic variables, such as the leverage of firms, the investment rate and the interest rate. Some of 
them pay explicit attention to stock-flow consistency while others do not. There are also some large 
stock-flow consistent (SFC) models that include complex financial structures and some Minskyan 
agent-based models (ABM). The latter analyse financial fragility via the interaction between 
individual firms and banks, placing emphasis on network effects, or allow heterogeneous firms to 
have different strategies or balance sheet structures. While some Minsky models concentrate more 
on the conditions under which local instability can arise, other models pay their attention to the 
emergence of cycles which in many cases arise when the equilibrium points are locally unstable but 
global stability exists because of bounded functions. 
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<Table 1> 
 
3. Debt or interest dynamics  
3.1 Kalecki-Minsky models  
In the Kalecki-Minsky models the investment decisions of firms are captured by a Kaleckian 
investment function in which the rate of profit plays a key role. If the retained profits are not 
sufficient to cover the investment expenditures, firms demand bank loans which are always supplied 
(i.e. there is no explicit credit rationing). The debt ratio has negative effects on investment because it 
increases the interest payments of firms. Output is demand-determined and the marginal propensity 
to save is higher than the marginal propensity to invest, ensuring goods market equilibrium. 
Typically, there are two types of households: rentiers who save a proportion of their income and 
workers who consume all their income. There is no equity market and therefore asset prices are 
assumed away.  
Lima and Meirelles (2007), Charles (2008), Fazzari et al. (2008) and Nishi (2012) have developed the 
most prominent recent Kalecki-Minsky models. These models draw to a great extent on the models 
developed by Jarsulic (1990), Dutt (1995) and Lavoie (1995) which were the first models that 
incorporated debt and finance into the Kaleckian framework. In our review we focus on the most 
recent models that pay more explicit attention to Minskyan dynamics. It is important to note that, 
with the exception of Fazzari et al. (2008), these models do not analyse cycles: they only focus on 
the conditions under which stability or instability arises. In addition, in many of these models the 
categorisation into hedge, speculative and Ponzi units is used and it is shown that instability is 
mostly associated with the speculative and Ponzi finance structures. Lastly, all the Kalecki-Minsky 
models are small structural models. 
Our analysis will start with the models that consider that the interest rate changes in an endogenous 
way either because of commercial bank decisions (Lima and Meirelles, 2007; Charles, 2008), or 
because of changes in inflation that are passed on to the nominal interest rate (Fazzari et al. 2008). 
Then we will analyse Nishi’s (2012) model where the interest rate is considered exogenous.  
Charles (2008) develops a Minsky model that is composed of firms, households and banks. Firms 
produce a single good that is used for consumption and investment purposes. Investment is financed 
via bank loans and retained profits. Equities are assumed away. There are two types of households: 
rentiers who save a proportion of their income and wealth and workers who consume all their 
income. Banks provide loans to firms on demand. Output is demand-determined. Commercial banks 
change the interest rates according to the indebtedness of firms.  
Firms’ desired investment rate ( dg ) depends on animal spirits ( ), the gross rate of profit ( r ) and 
the interest payments on accumulated debt. In particular, we have: 
 idrgd    (1) 
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where i  is the interest rate and d  is the ratio of firms’ debt ( D ) to capital ( K ).   is a positive 
parameter that captures the sensitivity of the investment rate to the net profit rate (which is equal 
to the gross rate of profit minus the interest payments to capital ratio). 
The net borrowing of firms ( D ) is derived from firms’ budget constraint. Thus, it is equal to 
investment ( I ) minus net retained profits: 
 iDRsID f   (2) 
where fs  is the retention rate and R  are the gross profits. Dividing through by capital stock, we 
get: 
 idrsg
K
D
f 

 (3) 
where g  is the effective investment rate. 
Rentiers receive the distributed profits of firms and interest income on deposits. The total saving of 
the economy is equal to the saving of firms plus the saving of rentiers. Hence, the ratio of saving to 
capital stock ( sg ) is given by: 
     ididrssidrsg fcfs  1  (4) 
where cs  is capitalists’ propensity to save out of their dividend income and interest on deposits.  
Charles (2008) makes a distinction between the desired and the effective investment rate and 
assumes that the effective investment rate adjusts towards the desired one via the following 
formula:  
 ggg d   (5) 
where 0  is the adjustment speed.  
Differentiating the debt-to-capital ratio, we get the law of motion of d : 
gd
K
D
d 

  (6) 
The interest rate is an increasing function of debt-to-capital ratio: 
dii   (7) 
where i  and   are positive parameters. The assumption is that a higher debt-to-capital ratio 
increases perceived risk, inducing banks to increase the interest rate in order to compensate for this 
risk.  
An increase in the debt-to-capital ratio has both positive and negative effects on effective 
investment rate. On the one hand, a higher debt-to-capital ratio tends to increase consumption (and 
thus capacity utilisation and profit rate) since the rise in the interest payments overcompensates the 
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decline in distributed profits, leading to higher rentier consumption. On the other hand, a higher 
debt-to-capital ratio tends to reduce the profit rate since firms have to pay higher interest. In 
Charles (2008) the adverse effects on investment overcompensate the positive ones and thus 
investment is debt-burdened.  
The 2D system of the model consists of the debt-to-capital ratio and the investment rate. Combining 
the debt-to-capital ratio with equation (7) we get an isocline that is quadratic in d . In a dg   
diagram the isocline is U-shaped. Hence, we get two equilibrium points. The first equilibrium point is 
stable and is characterised by high investment rate and low debt-to-capital ratio. The second 
equilibrium point is a saddle point and exhibits a low investment rate and a high debt-to-capital 
ratio. Charles (2008) tries to connect the equilibrium points with the finance regimes of Minsky: the 
stable point resembles a hedge finance structure while the saddle point is closer to the speculative 
or Ponzi finance structure. 
Lima and Meirelles (2007) construct a macrodynamic model which is similar to the model of Charles 
(2008). There are two crucial differences. The first one is that the authors formalise the hedge, 
speculative and Ponzi regime and use it in their dynamic analysis.4 The second difference is that the 
authors assume an endogenous interest rate that depends on economic activity and not on the 
leverage ratio. 5 In particular, in their model the law of motion of the interest rate is a function of the 
banking mark-up, which in turn depends on economic activity. The change in the interest is given by:  
 uuii b    (8) 
where bi  is the base interest rate set by the central bank,   is the responsiveness of the banking 
mark-up to capacity utilisation, u  is the capacity utilisation and u  is a threshold value for the 
capacity utilisation. Lima and Meirelles (2007) consider both the case in which interest rate is pro-
cyclical ( 0 ) and the case in which it is counter-cyclical ( 0 ). The commercial banks change the 
interest rate if economic activity is higher (lower) than the threshold value of the capacity utilisation. 
The 2D system of the model consists of the debt-to-capital ratio and the interest rate captured by 
equations (6) and (8). The authors identify the hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance regime areas in 
the gi   diagram. The system has one equilibrium point and its stability properties depend on the 
finance regime in which it is located. If it is located in the hedge finance area, the equilibrium point is 
stable when the banking mark-up is pro-cyclical and the growth rate is higher than the interest rate. 
When the banking mark-up is counter-cyclical, the equilibrium is unstable irrespective of the other 
conditions. If the equilibrium point is located in the speculative finance area, it is unstable when the 
propensity to save of capitalists is sufficiently low. When this propensity is high enough, stability will 
                                                          
4 The distinction between hedge and speculative units relies on the comparison between the gross profits and 
the sum of investment expenditures and interest payments. When the former is higher than the latter, we 
have a hedge regime while, when the opposite holds, we have a speculative regime. In the extreme case 
where the gross profits are lower than the interest payments, we have a Ponzi regime. 
5 There are some additional minor differences. In Lima and Meirelles’ set up the desired investment rate of 
firms depends on the interest rate and not on the interest payments on debt, a separate sensitivity to gross 
profits and interest rate is assumed, rentiers’ propensities to save out of interest and dividends are different 
and investment is debt-led (although in the dynamic analysis the investment rate is allowed to be debt-neutral 
by equalising the propensities to save out of interest and dividends). 
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arise only if the banking mark-up is pro-cyclical and the growth rate is higher than the interest rate. 
Finally, within a Ponzi regime the equilibrium point is always unstable. 
Fazzari et al. (2008) present a richer model that combines an investment function, which 
incorporates debt payments effects and an accelerator effect, with a non-linear Phillips curve. One 
key difference of their model with the other Kalecki-Minsky models is that the nominal interest rate 
increases when inflation goes up (the implicit assumption seems to be that the central bank has a 
real interest rate target which is fixed). Since inflation is a negative function of unemployment rate, 
it turns out that the nominal interest rate depends positively on economic activity.  
Investment depends on output, via an accelerator mechanism, as well as the expected real cash flow 
of firms. It is assumed that there are two types of consumers: the forward-looking and backward-
looking ones. The forward-looking consumers base their consumption on the expected income while 
the backward-looking ones consume based on the income of the previous period. Overall, an 
increase in economic activity increases the disposable income of households, leading to higher 
consumption. Firms take on debt in order to finance the difference between investment and cash 
flow. It is implicitly assumed that the saving rate of firms is equal to 1. The net borrowing of firms is 
determined in a similar way as in equation (2). The authors use a sophisticated version of the Phillips 
curve that assumes that wage inflation depends on productivity growth and the level as well as the 
change in unemployment, allowing thereby for unemployment hysteresis. Prices are determined via 
a mark-up over the unit labour costs and thus wage inflation directly affects price inflation.  
The model has a complex and non-linear dynamic structure and the authors thus resort to 
simulations based on empirically motivated parameters in order to investigate its properties. They 
show that in their benchmark simulations the system produces cycles after a positive demand shock. 
Initially, investment increases and gradually the debt ratio starts becoming higher. Simultaneously, 
higher economic activity leads to lower unemployment. This causes a rise in inflation (via the Phillips 
curve) which in turn leads to a rise in the nominal interest rate. The resulting increase in the debt 
service is the reason why the boom terminates at some point in time. The decline in economic 
activity ultimately leads to a reduction in the interest rate that makes the debt service lower, 
allowing the economy to recover. Fazzari et al. (2008) point out that, although the produced cycles 
eventually die out, they persist for a long period of time. They also illustrate that the responsiveness 
of the investment rate to the cash flow is one of the key parameters that affects the dynamic 
properties of their model. When this responsiveness increases, the amplitude of the cycles becomes 
higher; also, when the responsiveness becomes sufficiently high, the system produces asymptotic 
instability.  
We now turn to the model of Nishi (2012) who assumes that the interest rate is exogenous. The 
structure of his model is very similar to the structure of Charles’ (2008) model. A key difference is 
that in Nishi’s investment function the desired investment rate depends on the gross rate of profit 
and the interest payments separately, making it possible to get either a debt-burdened or a debt-led 
investment regime.  
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Nishi (2012) uses his model to examine how the various Minskyan finance regimes (hedge, 
speculative and Ponzi) can arise under different investment regimes.6  His discussion has a more 
long-term focus and effectively uses the finance regimes to discuss different levels of the (fixed) 
interest rate. He shows that when the interest rate is low we may have a hedge and speculative 
regime. When these non-Ponzi regimes are combined with a debt-burdened growth regime the 
equilibrium point is stable. However, if the non-Ponzi regimes are combined with a debt-led growth 
regime, we may have an unstable equilibrium point. When the interest rate is sufficiently high there 
is the possibility of a Ponzi regime. If the Ponzi regime is combined with a debt-led growth regime 
we always have instability. 
It is worth pointing out here that in the Kalecki-Minsky models presented above the leverage ratio 
turns out to be pro-cyclical in most cases. However, Lavoie and Seccareccia (2001) have argued that 
the Kaleckian framework does not in general generate a pro-cyclical leverage ratio, because 
investment creates profits. Thus while in the boom individual firms might want to take on more 
debt, the boom conditions make profits high and firms can finance investment internally. This is 
referred to as the paradox of debt.7 Charles (2016) has shown that in a Kalecki-Minsky model the 
counter-cyclicality of the leverage ratio is less likely when the retention rate of firms is low and/or 
the propensity to invest out of profits is high.  
To sum up, in the Kalecki-Minsky models debt is accumulated as firms demand bank loans in order 
to finance their desired investment expenditures. In most of these models the accumulation of debt 
has negative feedback effects on investment either directly (debt-burdened regime) or because of 
the fact that a higher debt ratio increases the interest rate (Charles, 2008). In some Kalecki-Minsky 
models the interest rate can also increase when there is higher economic activity that induces 
commercial banks to increase their banking mark-up (Lima and Meirelles, 2007) or when central 
banks increase the base interest rate due to higher inflation (Fazzari et al., 2008).  
 
3.2 Kaldor-Minsky models 
In Kaldor-Minsky models firms’ investment expenditures are positively affected by economic activity 
(either through the rate of profit or through the capacity utilisation) and are negatively or positively 
affected by the accumulation of debt. Similar to the Kalecki-Minsky models, output is demand 
determined, loans are provided on demand (i.e. there is no explicit credit rationing) and there is no 
equity market. The hall mark of the Kaldor-Minsky model is that investment is overshooting. In 
contrast to the Kalecki-Minsky models, there is an unstable goods market: the marginal propensity 
to save is lower than the marginal propensity to invest (close to the equilibrium). This is a 
characteristic of the Kaldor models (see e.g. Chiarella et al., 2000) that draw on Kaldor’s (1940) trade 
cycle model in which the marginal propensity to save is lower than the marginal propensity to invest 
at intermediate levels of output.  
                                                          
6 Nishi’s (2012) distinction between hedge and speculative regimes relies on the comparison of gross profits 
with net borrowing and interest payments. This allows hedge units to borrow, which is not the case in Lima 
and Meirelles (2007) where hedge units do not borrow. The Ponzi regime is defined as in Lima and Meirelles 
(2007). 
7 Lavoie (2014, p. 448) argues that when debt-led demand is combined with a counter-cyclical debt ratio, 
which he refers to as a ‘Steindl regime’, cycles can arise that work in the opposite direction of Minsky cycles. 
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Asada (2001) develops a highly stylised Kaldor-Minsky model where Minsky cycles can be produced. 
The author gives more emphasis to the assumptions that are needed to produce cycles while less 
attention is paid to the economic intuition of the macroeconomic model. The structure of Asada’s 
model is similar to the structure of Kalecki-Minsky models. His investment function can be written as 
follows: 
 fd sidrg ,,,  (9) 
where 0 rr  , 0 dd  , 0 ii   and 0 fsf s .  
The saving rate is given by: 
     dididrssidrsg fcfs  1  (10) 
This saving function is similar to the saving function of Charles (2008). The main difference is that 
Asada includes a positive impact of a safe asset on saving. This safe asset is assumed to be a linear 
function of the debt-to-capital ratio, i.e. it is equal to d . Therefore, equation (10) implies that an 
increase in the debt-to-capital ratio has both positive and negative effects on the saving rate. A 
higher   reinforces the positive effect of the debt ratio on the saving rate. 
The interest rate is a positive function of the debt-to-capital ratio as in Charles (2008). The output-
to-capital ratio increases when the sum of consumption-to-capital ratio and desired investment rate 
is higher than the current output-to-capital ratio:  
 ygcy d   (11) 
where KYy   is the output-to-capital ratio, KCc   is the consumption-to-capital ratio and   is 
a positive adjustment parameter. 
The debt-to-capital ratio and the output-to-capital ratio constitute the 2D system of the model, 
captured by equations (6) and (11) respectively. Asada (2001) assumes, without much explanation, 
that the goods market is de-stabilising, the output is debt-burdened, the leverage ratio is pro-cyclical 
and the debt ratio is self-stabilising.  
The author uses the Hopf bifurcation theorem in order to show the conditions under which a limit 
cycle arises. How does the cycle behave in this model? Suppose that the economy is initially 
characterised by a low output-to-capital ratio and a low debt-to-capital ratio. Since the debt-to-
capital ratio is sufficiently low, the investment rate gradually becomes higher. When investment and 
output have become sufficiently high, the debt-to-capital ratio starts increasing. At some point, this 
increasing debt-to-capital ratio causes a decline in the investment rate and thus in output-to-capital 
ratio. Once the investment rate has become sufficiently low, the debt-to-capital ratio decreases and 
the economy enters into a new expansionary period. 
Semmler (1987) has developed another model with Kaldor-Minsky features. He introduces financial 
variables into a profit-investment dynamic system where the saving function is S-shaped as in 
Kaldor. The system without the financial variables produces a limit cycle. In the system with the 
financial variables the interest rate and the debt payment commitments have a negative impact on 
investment (i.e. investment is debt-burdened) and the debt-to-capital ratio rises during the 
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expansions (i.e. leverage is pro-cyclical). The introduction of the financial variables can reduce the 
amplitude of the limit cycle (i.e. expansions become shorter and contractions become less severe) or 
can increase the possibility of instability. 
Two other Kaldor-Minsky models are those developed by Foley (1987) and Jarsulic (1989) in which 
the interest rate plays a key role in the emergence of the cycles. In Foley’s model a decline in the 
interest rate increases borrowing which in turn increases investment and profitability. However, 
higher demand for credit produces a rise in the interest rate (via a loanable funds market) which has 
a negative impact on borrowing. Foley (1987) uses the Hopf bifurcation theorem in order to show 
the emergence of cycles. Jarsulic’s (1989) model generates some similar dynamics. He postulates an 
investment function where the investment rate depends negatively on the interest rate and he also 
assumes that a higher investment rate increases the interest rate. His investment function is non-
linear: he assumes that the investment rate starts declining when it is already high. As a result, his 
2D dynamic system is bounded which allows him to use the Poincaré-Bendixson theorem to show 
the emergence of a limit cycle. According to this theorem, a 2D system that is locally unstable, 
bounded and has a unique stationary point produces a limit cycle. 
Skott (1994) develops a Kaldorian model in which some abstract financial variables are introduced in 
the investment function. In particular, he uses a financial fragility variable ( F ) and a tranquillity 
variable (T ). The financial fragility variable captures the sensitivity of the financial system to small 
disturbances that might affect the ability of economic units to fulfil their financial obligations. As a 
proxy of financial fragility, Skott (1994) uses the ratio of interest payments to the normal rate of 
profit ( ridF  ). As he points out, “Fragility and tranquillity evolve endogenously and, in accordance 
with Minsky’s behavioural assumptions, it is assumed that changes in fragility depend on the degree 
of tranquillity: in the absence of financial difficulties agents adopt schemes of increasing optimism” 
(Skott, 1994, p. 53). Therefore, the change in the financial fragility ratio is given by: 
TF   (12) 
The tranquillity variable is associated with the appearance or not of crises. When a system 
experiences a crisis, tranquillity is at its minimum value since default and bankruptcy rates are high. 
Tranquillity is at its maximum value when the financial system functions without disruptions and 
economic activity is high. As Skott (1994, p. 53) explains, “financial difficulties develop as a result of 
an incongruence between the optimism which motivated financial arrangements and the actual 
outcome. If the source of potential instability is located primarily in the business sector (…) then T
should depend on financial fragility (inversely) and on realized profit rates (positively)”. Hence, he 
assumes that T  is a negative function of F  and a positive function of output-to-capital ratio: 
BFAyT   (13) 
The investment function is written as: 
  TFyg d    (14) 
where  y  is a function where   0 yyy  . Similarly to the Kalecki-Minsky models, an 
increase in economic activity increases investment. However, following Kaldor, it is assumed that 
investment is an S-shaped function, which implies that the investment rate is bounded (it stops 
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increasing as output-to-capital ratio becomes too high). In addition, investment is positively or 
negatively affected by financial fragility (i.e.   can be positive or negative) and is positively affected 
by the tranquillity indicator ( 0 ). Since ridF   and BFAuT  , equation (14) can be rewritten 
as follows: 
   
r
id
BAyyg d    (15) 
where r  is the normal profit rate while A  and B  are positive parameters. Equation (15) implies 
that an increase in economic activity positively affects the investment rate while the interest 
payments on debt may have a positive or a negative effect on the investment rate. Saving is a 
function of output and output adjusts to the difference between investment and saving via an 
equation which is similar to equation (11) used by Asada (2001).  
The fragility ratio and the output-to-capital ratio constitute the 2D system. Skott (1994) analyses the 
stability conditions for this 2D system by considering two cases. In the first case, the impact of 
financial fragility on investment is positive. It is shown that in this case the model can be stable or 
unstable and does not produce cycles. In the second case, the impact of financial fragility on 
investment is negative. This makes it possible to generate cycles which are similar to the cycles 
generated by the model of Asada (2001). Since Skott’s system is bounded due to the S-shaped 
investment function, he uses the Poincaré-Bendixson theorem to illustrate the conditions under 
which a limit cycle emerges.  
To summarise, most Kaldor-Minsky models have a similar structure with the Kalecki-Minsky models. 
However, in the Kaldor-Minsky models the main source of instability is the accelerator mechanism 
that is included in the investment function and renders the goods market unstable. Compared to the 
Kalecki-Minsky models, the analysis of the Kaldor-Minsky models pays more attention to the 
conditions under which cycles emerge. In some Kaldor-Minsky models the interest rate is exogenous 
(e.g. Skott, 1994), while in other models the endogenous change in the interest rate is a key part of 
the cyclical behaviour (e.g. Foley, 1987 and Jarsulic, 1989). 
 
3.3 Goodwin-Minsky models 
Keen (1995) develops a Goodwin model with some Minskyan features that operate through the 
wage share equation: a higher debt ratio dampens investment and employment, which affects the 
wage share, which in turn affects the debt ratio. The use of the Goodwin framework implies that the 
Goodwin-Minsky models treat the labour market explicitly. This is a distinct feature compared to 
most other Minsky models in which labour market dynamics are absent. 
Keen (1995) assumes full capital utilisation and, as a result, output is determined by capital stock, 
which is driven by the past investment decisions of capitalists. This comes in contrast to the Kalecki-
Minsky and Kaldor-Minsky models where output is demand-determined. Keen (1995) extends the 
Goodwin model to include banks, whose rising income share can squeeze industrial profits similar to 
how a rising wage share squeezes profits. Unlike the Goodwin model, where all profits are 
reinvested, Keen (1995) uses a non-linear (convex) investment function, which creates a pro-cyclical 
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debt ratio. The interest rate is a positive function of the debt ratio. The theoretical problem of this 
model is that it does not offer a mechanism that equilibrates investment and saving.8 
The gross investment rate (i.e. net investment rate plus depreciation rate) depends on the net profit 
rate of firms: 
 idrg    (16) 
where   is a convex function of the net profit rate. We have that vidr   where v  is the capital-
output ratio, b  1  is the profit share,   is the wage share and YiDb   is the bankers’ 
income share. This means that the gross investment rate ends up being a positive function of the 
profit share. The convexity of the investment function implies that the profit share has a gradually 
higher effect on the investment rate. In particular, for relatively low values of the profit share, 
investment is equal to profits but for relatively high values of the profit share investment becomes 
higher than profits, which means that the accumulation of debt accelerates.  
As in Goodwin’s model, the wage share changes in an endogenous way. Since xw , the change 
in the wage share is: 
    l  (17) 
where   is a non-linear positive function of the employment rate ( l ),   is the growth rate of 
labour productivity, w  is the wage rate and x  is labour productivity. When the employment rate 
becomes higher, the wage share increases. 
Since the employment rate is xNYl  , the law of motion of l  is: 
 lgl    (18) 
where   is the growth rate of labour force and N  is the labour force. 
The net borrowing of firms depends on the difference between the investment rate and net profits. 
Keen (1995) normalises debt by dividing it by output and assumes that firm retain all their profits. In 
similar lines with Charles (2008), the interest rate is an increasing function of the indebtedness of 
firms (Keen uses the debt-to-output ratio instead of the debt-to-capital ratio).  
The 3D system consists of the wage share and the employment, as in the Goodwin model, as well as 
the debt-to-capital ratio. Keen (1995) does not offer an analytical solution of the model, but moves 
swiftly to simulation.9 Thus the paper is more effective in illustrating the instabilities that can arise 
rather than clarifying the properties of the model. In his simulations Keen (1995) shows that both 
stability and instability can arise in his dynamic system. Instability arises when the base interest rate 
is high and/or when the interest rate is low and the sensitivity of the interest rate to the debt-to-
capital is high. The system breaks down because the rate of profit becomes negative primarily 
                                                          
8 The Keynesian mechanism of equilibrating investment and saving is blocked because Say’s law is assumed to 
hold; the classical mechanism is blocked because the interest rate does not clear the market for loanable funds 
but is determined by the leverage ratio. 
9 Such an analytical solution is provided by Grasselli and Costa Lima (2012). 
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because of increasing firms’ interest payments. Keen (1995) shows that a break down is prevented 
when counter-cyclical fiscal policy is introduced. However, in his simulations fiscal policy does not 
eliminate cycles. Keen (2013) extends the model described above by including an explicit banking 
sector, endogenous money creation and a more explicit financial structure based on the SFC 
approach. 
Sordi and Vercelli (2014) argue that Keen (1995) does not take into account that the goods market 
may be in a disequilibrium and they use an output adjustment mechanism. They propose a model 
based on Goodwin (1951) flexible accelerator. Therefore, in contrast to Keen (1995), output is 
demand determined and investment is demand driven (without direct effect of profitability or debt). 
In our classification it is thus closer to the Kaldor-Minsky model. They derive a 4D system with the 
wage share, the employment rate, the debt-to-capital ratio and the capital-to-output ratio as state 
variables and use the Hopf bifurcation theorem to prove the possibility of cycles. Instability in their 
model is more likely when investment responds strongly to expected output. 
Stockhammer and Michell (2017) demonstrate that pseudo-Goodwin cycles can arise from a Minsky 
model that is paired with a reserve-army distribution function. Unlike the Goodwin-Minsky model, in 
their model output is demand determined and demand is debt-burdened and wage-led. The cycles 
are Minskyan debt cycles and income distribution fluctuates as it is dragged along by the business 
cycles. The economy thus exhibits pseudo-Goodwin cycles.  
 
3.4 Credit rationing Minsky models  
A key feature of the Minskyan models presented above is that banks play a relatively passive role. 
Although in some of these models banks increase the interest rate when the debt ratio of firms 
increases (e.g. Charles, 2008) or banks are in some cases implicitly considered to co-determine the 
accumulation of debt, there is no explicit credit rationing based on the financial position of banks. 
This is at odds with Minsky who has argued that banks are active players in the emergence of 
financial fragility and credit expansion relies on their financial structure (e.g. Minsky, 1986 [2008], p. 
265). The models of Ryoo (2013b), Nikolaidi (2014) and Delli Gatti et al. (2005, 2010) belong to the 
credit rationing Minsky models.10  
Ryoo (2013b) develops an SFC model that consists of firms, households and banks. Firms take on 
debt and issue equities in order to externally finance their investment. Equity is the residual source 
of finance11 and the equity-to-deposits ratio in the household portfolio choice is assumed to be 
constant. This implies that the price of equities needs to adjust in order to keep the ratio constant. 
Banks provide loans taking into account the profit-to-interest payment ratio and the profitability of 
banks. The bank capital ratio positively depends on the profitability of firms.  
                                                          
10 The impact of banks’ financial position on credit rationing is taken into account in the recent model of 
Kapeller et al. (2016). However, their model analyses household debt while our credit rationing Minsky models 
refer exclusively to corporate debt. 
11 Ryoo (2010) supports this assumption by presenting some evidence that the ratio of issues of equity to 
investment is very volatile and argues that this volatility is better captured when equity emission is modelled 
as a buffer. 
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Ryoo (2013b) distinguishes between short cycles and long waves. Based on Skott (1989), the short 
cycles result from the interaction between destabilising goods market dynamics à la Kaldor and 
stabilising labour market dynamics. Investment depends on capacity utilisation and there is an 
explicit function for economic growth whereby growth is affected positively by the profit share and 
negatively by the employment rate. The profit share is increasing in capacity utilisation. As capacity 
utilisation increases, growth rate responds strongly. The increase in growth rate increases 
employment. When employment becomes sufficiently high it exerts a negative impact on economic 
growth, allowing the emergence of cycles.  
The long wave of the model is captured by a 2D system which has the leverage ratios of firms and 
banks as state variables. It is shown that instability is more likely as the responsiveness of credit 
availability to bank profits increases. Using the Poincaré-Bendixson theorem, it is shown that cycles 
arise when the system becomes locally unstable. The rationale of the cycle is as follows. When the 
leverage ratio of firms and banks is low, the debt-to-capital ratio starts increasing because firms are 
considered to be creditworthy and, hence, more loans are provided by banks. As loans expand, the 
leverage of banks, which goes hand in hand with bank profitability, goes up. This enhances credit 
supply. However, when the leverage of firms becomes sufficiently high, firms start being considered 
less creditworthy. This causes a reduction in credit supply, which in turn leads to a decline in bank 
leverage and bank profitability which reinforces the decline in credit. The reduction in credit leads to 
a lower firm leverage. When the leverage ratios of both firms and banks have become sufficiently 
low, credit starts increasing again and a new cycle begins.  
Ryoo (2013b) suggests that instability in his model can be reduced if a financial regulation rule is 
adopted according to which banks adjust their retention rate in order to achieve a specific leverage 
ratio. This rule relies on Minsky’s writings about the ways through which banking instability can be 
tamed (see Minsky, 1986 [2008], ch. 13). 
Nikolaidi (2014) develops an SFC model with firms, households, banks, government and a central 
bank. Both firms and banks have a target leverage ratio which captures their desired margins of 
safety that are deemed to change in an endogenous way: when economic activity is high (low), the 
target leverage ratios increase (decrease). The target leverage ratio of firms affects their desired 
investment. The higher the target leverage ratio of firms compared to the actual ratio, the higher 
their investment, ceteris paribus. Banks provide only a proportion of the loans demanded. They are 
more willing to reduce credit rationing when their leverage ratio is lower than the target one. Firms 
take on debt to finance their desired investment which is negatively affected by the leverage ratio of 
firms. Since there is credit rationing the effective investment is lower than the desired investment. 
Banks’ credit rationing is affected by their leverage ratio and the leverage ratio of firms.12 Therefore, 
in boom periods both the desired investment and the provision of loans become gradually higher, 
which might lead to instability. The opposite holds in bust periods. Instability is more likely when the 
target leverage ratios respond strongly to changes in economic activity.  
The model can produce cycles (this is shown using the Hopf bifurcation theorem). The cycles can be 
described as follows. When investment activity is sufficiently high, the target leverage ratios of both 
firms and banks increase, leading to higher desired investment and lower credit rationing. This 
                                                          
12 The formulation of credit rationing draws on the SFC model of Le Heron and Mouakil (2008) who, in line with 
Minsky, assume that credit rationing depends both on borrower’s and lender’s risk.  
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increases debt accumulation and the actual leverage ratios. However, once the leverage ratios have 
become sufficiently high, both firms and banks become less willing to participate in new debt 
contracts and economic activity starts slowing down. The decline in economic activity makes the 
leverage ratios lower and, at the same time, reduces the target leverage ratios of firms and banks 
reinforcing the contractionary forces. A new boom starts when the leverage ratios have declined 
sufficiently. Nikolaidi (2014) also examines the role of fiscal policy. It is shown that counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy can reduce the instability that stems from the behaviours of firms and banks.  
While most of the literature on Minsky uses small-scale or large-scale macro models, there is also a 
family that emphasises heterogeneity among firms and uses agent-based modelling techniques. Delli 
Gatti et al. (2005, 2010) have developed such models with heterogeneous firms and/or 
heterogeneous banks. Theoretically these models draw on the financial accelerator argument that 
the availability of credit for firms depends on their net worth (Bernanke and Gertler, 1990; 
Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993). However, in line with the credit rationing models discussed above, the 
credit conditions are also affected by the net worth of banks. In particular, the interest rate depends 
on the financial position of both firms and banks. Bankruptcy is explicitly introduced (which is an 
innovation compared to most Minsky models). When a firm goes bankrupt, this affects adversely the 
net worth of banks, leading to a higher interest rate. This in turn reduces the net worth of firms. 
Following stylised facts, firm size obeys a power law. This highly skewed distribution implies that 
idiosyncratic shocks can turn into macro shocks (if they affect one of the few very large firms). This is 
compounded by network effects that can cause bankruptcy cascades. It is worth mentioning that 
there is no aggregate demand function comparable to those of most previously discussed models, 
but output is determined by the optimising behaviour of credit and net worth constrained firms. 
Unlike many of the models discussed in this survey the main aim is not to analyse endogenous cycles 
but the conditions under which random shocks can turn into systemic crises. In some ways the 
models are closer to the New Keynesian financial accelerator approach, but they also highlight 
Minskyan features.  
To sum up, in credit rationing Minsky models cycles and instability are affected by the behaviour and 
the financial position of banks. In some models the interest rate is exogenous and banks affect the 
volume of credit directly (Ryoo, 2013b; Nikolaidi, 2014) while in other models the interest rate is a 
function of the financial position of firms and banks (Delli Gatti et al., 2005, 2010). Banks contribute 
to the increase in financial fragility during the boom periods by increasing credit availability and/or 
providing credit at favourable terms. They can reinforce the destabilising forces in the bust period 
since their financial soundness is affected by macroeconomic performance and this has feedback 
effects on credit conditions.  
 
3.5 Endogenous target debt ratio Minsky models  
In the endogenous target debt ratio Minsky models, firms, banks or the private sector in general 
have targets about their leverage ratios. These targets are also called stock-flow norms (based on 
Godley) or desired margins of safety (based on Minsky). The target debt ratios tend to increase when 
economic and financial performance is good and they tend to decline when economic and financial 
environment is perceived to be unfavourable and unstable. Higher target debt ratios increase 
desired investment or desired consumption and tend to reduce credit rationing. In the endogenous 
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target debt ratio models output is demand determined, the interest rate is exogenous and there is 
no consideration of the labour market.  
The model of Nikolaidi (2014), described in the previous section, was the first model that used 
explicitly an endogenous target debt ratio. Dafermos (2017) incorporated this idea of an endogenous 
target debt ratio into a Godleyan analytical framework. Following Godley’s projection analysis (e.g. 
Godley, 1999), his model consists of three sectors: the private sector (which is consolidated), the 
government sector and the foreign sector. The balances and the debt of these sectors are explicitly 
interrelated via Godley’s financial balances approach. The private sector has a stock-flow norm (the 
target net debt-to-income ratio) which is allowed to change endogenously based on the Minskyan 
idea that the perception of risk and, hence, the desired margins of safety change during the 
economic cycle. 
In his dynamic analysis he first examines a system with the propensity to spend of the private sector 
and the private debt-to-income ratio as state variables. In this system the propensity to spend of the 
private sector increases (decreases) when the target debt-to-income ratio is higher (lower) than the 
actual one. Using the Poincaré-Bendixson theorem, Dafermos (2017) shows that this system can 
produce cycles. Instability and cycles are more likely when the responsiveness of the propensity to 
spend to the target debt ratio is high. He also shows that when the target debt ratio is endogenised 
via a Minsky mechanism, an otherwise stable system can become unstable. 
This model is also used to examine the implications of two fiscal rules: (i) a Maastricht-type fiscal 
rule in which government expenditures decline (increases) when government indebtedness is high 
(low) and (ii) a Godley-Minsky fiscal rule that is close to the idea of counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The 
simulation analysis in the paper shows that the Maastricht type fiscal rule is conducive to instability 
while the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule tends to stabilise the macroeconomy. 
Jump et al. (2017) develop a model with heterogeneous firms in which the aggregate target debt 
ratio is determined by firms’ decisions via a switching mechanism. Firms choose between a hedge 
strategy with a low target debt ratio or a speculative strategy with a high target. The probability that 
firms select the speculative strategy increases as the interest payments relative to profits decreases 
and the volatility of output goes down. This implies that good and stable economic and financial 
performance induces more firms to select the speculative strategy, resulting in a higher aggregate 
target debt ratio. In the model, a higher target debt ratio affects investment positively (but actual 
debt negatively). The 3D system of the model consists of output, debt and the proportion of the 
firms that choose the hedge strategy. This system can produce limit cycles: in a stable growth period 
firms switch to higher debt targets. The initial equilibrium becomes unstable and leads to a boom. 
Once volatility increases firms switch back to a hedge strategy. The model can also give rise to 
chaotic dynamics if firms are allowed to accumulate financial assets.  
 
3.6 Minsky-Veblen models 
Despite the fact that household debt was not at the core of Minsky's analysis, there are some early 
Minsky models that have formalised consumer debt using Minskyan ideas (e.g. Palley, 1994, 1997). 
More recently, the Veblenian analysis of emulation motives has been used in some Minsky models 
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to analyse the dynamics of consumer debt and the implications for financial fragility (Kapeller and 
Schütz, 2014; Ryoo and Kim, 2014; Kapeller et al., 2016). In these models low-income households 
take on debt in order to emulate the consumption of richer households.13  
Ryoo and Kim (2014) develop a Kaldorian SFC model with households, firms and banks. Firms make 
investment expenditures by using equity and undistributed profits (they do not take out loans). 
There are two types of households: workers and rentiers. Workers demand consumer credit in order 
to increase their consumption and emulate the consumption of rentiers. Banks provide loans to 
workers taking into account their net income. Rentiers consume part of their income and wealth and 
do not take on debt. The 2D system of the model comprises the debt-to-capital ratio and the 
emulation motive. With this system cycles may emerge (the authors use the Poincaré-Bendixson 
theorem to show that). When the indebtedness of workers is sufficiently low, workers are more 
willing to take on debt in order to emulate the rentiers and, simultaneously, banks are more willing 
to provide these loans. This increases the debt-to-capital ratio which has feedback effects into the 
emulation: workers have to pay a higher interest that reduces their income and increases the 
income of rentiers. This reinforces the consumption differential between workers and rentiers 
producing a further rise in the debt-to-capital ratio. Once the debt ratio has reached a sufficiently 
high level, workers become less willing to take on more debt and banks become less 
accommodative. Note that instability and cycles are more likely when banks’ decision to provide 
loans is more accommodating and workers’ decision to emulate the rentiers is sufficiently strong. 
Kapeller and Schütz (2014) develop a large-scale SFC model that consists of firms, households and 
banks. There are three main differences between the model of Kapeller and Schütz (2014) and Ryoo 
and Kim (2014). First, Kapeller and Schütz (2014) incorporate three types of households instead of 
two: (i) type 1 worker households whose income share is constant; (ii) type 2 worker households 
whose income share is declining; (iii) rentiers. Emulation refers only to the intra-worker 
consumption: it is assumed that type 2 workers try to emulate the consumption of type 1 workers 
and the consumption of rentiers does not affect the consumption of workers. Second, in similar lines 
with Charles (2008), Kapeller and Schütz (2014) assume an endogenous interest rate which is a 
positive function of debt. Third, bankruptcy is introduced. Workers become bankrupt when they 
cannot cover their subsistence-level consumption. When this happens, banks’ expectations are 
adversely affected and credit supply goes down.  
In their simulations, Kapeller and Schütz (2014) produce cycles. Initially, the decline in the income of 
type 2 worker households relative to the income of type 1 worker households leads to an increase in 
their indebtedness which also leads to an increase in the interest rate. However, at some point in 
time the rise in indebtedness causes bankruptcies that stop credit expansion leading to a decline in 
economic activity. After some periods, the economy recovers because bankruptcies reduce the debt 
of type 2 worker households, increasing their income. 
                                                          
13 Charpe et al. (2009) develop a Minskyan model with a Goodwin-type labour market in which workers take 
on debt in order to increase their consumption expenditures. The model is similar to the Minsky-Veblen 
models in that consumption expenditures are driving the financial dynamics and household debt is key. 
However, loans are solely determined by the fact that workers have an exogenous marginal propensity to 
consume which is larger than one and there is no explicit mechanism through which they emulate the 
consumption norms of richer households.  
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Kapeller et al. (2016) extend the model developed by Kapeller and Schütz (2014) by introducing the 
role of fiscal policy and a more active banking sector. In their simulations they investigate the effects 
of various government interventions (such as fiscal stimulus and bank bailouts) and financial 
regulation on the financial cycles. They show that the government interventions mitigate the impact 
of financial crises but they shorten the time between the crises since they are conducive to higher 
credit expansion. The financial crises become much less severe when a stricter financial regulation 
(captured by a higher responsiveness of credit availability to the leverage of banks) is implemented.  
Overall, in the Minsky-Veblen models consumer debt is the driver of financial fragility. Credit 
expansion depends positively on inequality and the financial soundness of households. Financial 
booms come to an end when the interest payments of households have become sufficiently high. 
The endogeneity of the interest rate is not necessary in order to get financial cycles. 
 
4. Asset price dynamics  
The models described in the previous sections do not allow a role for asset price dynamics. This is at 
odds with Minsky’s analysis according to which asset inflation positively affects investment and 
economic activity (see, for example, his ‘two price’ theory of investment). Actually, most Minskyan 
models that were developed in late 1980s and early 1990s paid particular attention to the role of 
asset prices. This changed after mid 1990s when most authors started developing Minskyan models 
using the Kaleckian framework where asset prices do not play a key role. 14 However, since 2010 
there has been a resurgence of interest in Minsky models with asset prices. It is also interesting that 
the asset price Minsky models have traditionally confined their attention to equity prices ─ real 
estate prices have only very recently been incorporated into Minskyan frameworks. 
 
4.1 Equity price Minsky models  
The equity price Minsky models place particular attention on the equity price dynamics and their 
interactions with the real economy. In these models there is an equity market and households take 
portfolio decisions that affect the demand for equity and thus the equity price, which in turn affects 
economic activity through consumption or investment. Equity market is the principal source of 
instability and both cycles and instability are investigated. 
Taylor and O’Connell (1985) developed the first model that formalised Minsky’s arguments and put 
equity prices at the core of the analysis. Their model economy consists of firms, households and a 
government. Banks are not explicitly considered. Firms issue equity in order to finance their 
investment expenditures. There are two types of households: workers who consume all of their 
income and rentiers who invest in three different assets: equity, money and government bonds. 
Money is exogenous and the interest rate changes endogenously. 
                                                          
14 There are many SFC models that were developed in 2000s and analysed the interactions between asset 
prices, the leverage of firms and the real economy (e.g. Lavoie and Godley, 2001-2; van Treeck, 2009). 
However, most of these models do not examine explicitly Minskyan dynamics. 
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Firms’ desired investment rate depends on the actual rate of profit ( r ), a confidence variable that 
captures the difference between the expected and the actual rate of profit (  ) and the interest rate 
( i ):  
 irgd    (19) 
where   is the responsiveness of firms’ investment to the expected difference between profit and 
interest costs. The variable   plays a key role in the model since it captures the role of expectations. 
When expectations improve,   increases, having a positive impact on the investment rate. Its law of 
motion is given by: 
 ii    (20) 
According to equation (20), expectations improve when the interest rate is lower than a normal 
interest rate, i . The dynamics of the model rely on the interaction between   and money. Suppose 
that there is an exogenous increase in the confidence of firms. Higher confidence has two 
countervailing effects on the interest rate. On the one hand, improved expectations increase 
investment and economic activity causing a rise in the interest rate via the traditional IS-LM 
mechanism. On the other hand, a higher expected rate of profit shifts wealth from money into 
equity. This reduction in the demand for money tends to reduce the interest rate. If the first effect 
dominates, the system converges towards its fixed point after some damped oscillations. This is 
because the model assumes a negative effect of the interest rate on expected profitability. If the 
second effect dominates, the system becomes unstable. This is more likely when there is high asset 
substitution.  
Franke and Semmler (1989) extended the model of Taylor and O’Connell (1985) by including firm 
loans. Net borrowing increases when   becomes higher and the debt-to-capital ratio becomes 
lower. The underlying assumption is that banks take into account both the expected gross 
profitability and the indebtedness of the firms when they decide about the provision of loans. There 
are no government bonds and households choose only between two assets: equities and deposits. 
The debt-to-capital ratio takes values between zero and one. When the debt ratio is equal to one the 
risk of bankruptcy is at its maximum level and hence no further lending and borrowing can take 
place. This introduces a boundedness in the system. The change in   is a positive function of the 
difference between the rate of profit and the interest rate and a negative function of the debt-to-
capital ratio. Overall, their model produces a dynamic interaction between   and the debt-to-
capital ratio. This dynamic interaction can give rise to stability or cycles depending on the 
responsiveness of the law of motion of the debt-to-capital ratio to itself and  .  
Delli Gatti and Gallegati (1990) develop a model which has many similarities with the model of 
Taylor and O’Connell (1985) but differ primarily in the way that the investment function and the 
portfolio choice are formalised. Firms invest taking into account their retained profits and the 
difference between asset prices and the price of investment goods. By using such an investment 
specification, the authors formalise Minsky’s ‘two price’ theory of investment. Interestingly, it is 
assumed that the sensitivity of investment to profits increases during the upward phase of the 
business cycle (however, they do not include an explicit equation for that). The rationale for this pro-
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cyclical sensitivity is that during expansion firms’ profits increase and as a result both firms and 
banks consider that the projects are less risky and thereby investment relative to profits becomes 
higher. Households consume part of their income. Their demand for money depends on the 
transaction motive, the speculative motive and the finance motive. The demand for finance is equal 
to the financing gap: the difference between investment and retained profits. There is implicitly a 
portfolio choice between equity and money. The authors use the leverage ratio as an indicator of 
financial fragility. The leverage ratio is defined as the ratio between the financing gap and retained 
profits.  
The 2D system of the model consists of the profits of firms and the price of equity. The change in 
profits is determined by the difference between investment and saving (the IS curve) while the law 
of motion of equity prices is obtained by the difference between the supply and the demand for 
money (the LM curve). The model can produce various dynamics depending on the relative strength 
of the different effects. The authors pay particular attention to the case in which profits, leverage 
and equity prices move hand in hand during the ascending phase of the business cycle. 
Delli Gatti et al. (1994) extended the model of Delli Gatti and Gallegatti (1990). They made two key 
changes. First, they included an explicit portfolio choice between equity and money. The demand for 
each asset depends on the expected rates of return. Second, they incorporated an equation in which 
the propensity to invest out of profits is a positive function of output. The model can produce cycles 
that behave as follows. During the ascending phase of the business cycle the propensity to invest out 
of profits increases. As a result, investment and output become higher, increasing external finance 
and debt. At the same time, since economic activity increases dividends, investors decide to increase 
their holdings in equity and the price equity gradually improves. This equity price inflation boosts 
investment. However, at some point, internal funds do not increase sufficiently compared to debt 
commitments. At this point we have a recession in which investment, output and the price of equity 
become lower. As a result, the propensity to invest with respect to profits gradually becomes lower. 
This produces a larger drop in investment and economic activity exacerbating the recession. 
Economic activity starts increasing again when debt commitments have been reduced sufficiently 
compared to profits. 
More recently, Ryoo (2010, 2013a) developed an equity price Minsky model that builds on the 
above-mentioned models. There are five key differences: (i) asset prices affect economic activity not 
only via investment but also via consumption; (ii) money is assumed to be determined endogenously 
and the interest rate is exogenous; (iii) the interaction between the portfolio choice and debt 
dynamics is modelled more explicitly and the role of capital gains is taken into account; (iv) the 
model pays particular attention to stock-flow consistency; (v) a distinction is made between short 
cycles and long waves. 
Ryoo’s (2010, 2013a) model consists of households, firms and banks. Contrary to Ryoo (2013b), the 
equity-to-deposits ratio is not constant: the demand for equities increases when the return on 
equity becomes higher than the interest rate on deposits. Investment expenditures are financed via 
retained profits, banks loans and equities. Loans are assumed to increase when the profitability of 
firms improves; contrary to Ryoo (2013b), the availability of credit does not depend on the financial 
position of banks. As in Ryoo (2013b), equity issue acts as the residual source of finance for firms.  
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Ryoo (2013a) has developed a Kaleckian and a Kaldorian version of his model. In the Kaleckian 
version the goods market is stable as in the Kalecki-Minsky models and capacity utilisation is allowed 
to fluctuate. Investment is debt-led. This comes from the fact that (i) loans are equal to deposits and, 
as a result, a rise in loans leads to a rise in the wealth and the interest income of households, 
boosting consumption and (ii) investment depends only on capacity utilisation and not on the rate of 
profit, which means that the interest payments of firms have no effect on investment. Ryoo shows 
that in such a Kaleckian model the portfolio decisions of households can produce a cyclical 
behaviour.  
Let us now focus on the Kaldorian version of the model. As in Ryoo (2013b), the Kaldorian version 
distinguishes between short cycles and long waves. The short cycles are Kaldorian real cycles while 
the long waves refer to financial cycles. The system that produces the long waves consists of three 
state variables: the equity-to-deposits ratio, the expected rate of return on equity and the debt-to-
capital ratio.  
In the long run the actual capacity utilisation is equal to the exogenously given desired one. The 
household wealth-to-capital ratio is given by   KMepe  , where ep  is the price of equities, e  is the 
number of equities and M  denotes deposits. Since in the model MD   (i.e. loans are equal to 
deposits), we have that the household wealth-to-capital ratio is equivalent to the Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q 
can be written as a function of the equity-to-deposits ratio ( Depa e ) and debt-to-capital ratio: 
 da
K
Dep
q
e


 1  (21) 
Tobin’s q could be incorporated in the Kaleckian investment function in order to get a direct link 
between asset prices and investment. However, this would not change the essence of the dynamic 
analysis (Ryoo, 2013a, p. 49). 
Households’ consumption depends on disposable income and wealth. Using a linear specification, 
we have: 
qcyc
K
C
d 21   (22) 
where dy  is the disposable income of households (equal to wages, dividends and interest on 
deposits), 1c  and 2c  are positive parameters. 
The ratio of equity-to-deposits ( a ) and the expected rate of return on equity ( e ) change according 
to the following equations: 
  aia e    (23) 
 ee    (24) 
where   is the (actual) rate of return on equity,   and   are positive parameters and   is a 
positive non-linear function of the expected rate of return on equity (i.e. 0 e ). Equation (23) 
shows that households’ desired equity-to-deposits ratio,  ie  , is higher the higher is the 
expected rate of return on equity compared to the interest rate on deposits (the latter is assumed to 
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be equal to the interest rate on loans). The equity-to-deposits ratio increases when the desired one 
is higher than the actual one. Equation (24) implies that the expected rate of return on equity 
changes via an adaptive expectations mechanism whereby the expected rate of return on equity 
increases when the actual rate of return is higher than the expected one. From equations (23) and 
(24) we can derive the evolution of the price of equities. Ryoo (2013a) mentions that these 
equations can be viewed as a reduced form of the interactions between fundamentalists and 
chartists that are analysed in the behavioural finance literature but gives otherwise little explanation 
for these key equations that drive the cycle. Equations (23) and (24) can be derived from a 
momentum trader model where momentum traders (or chartists) and fundamentalists co-exist (Beja 
and Goldman, 1980). Fundamentalists expect the price to return to its fundamental value (thus the 
negative effect of a  on a ), whereas the momentum traders expect a further increase in prices when 
asset price growth exceed expected capital gains (equation 24).  
The debt-to-capital ratio increases as the profit-interest ratio becomes higher. According to Ryoo 
(2013a) the profit-interest ratio captures the fundamental margins of safety. Therefore, when this 
ratio becomes higher firms are more willing to take on more debt and banks are more willing to 
expand credit. Thus debt also changes endogenously over the cycle, it plays a role in transmitting the 
cycle to the real sector and interacts with asset prices; however, it is not essential for the cycle itself. 
Ryoo (2013a) shows that closed orbits or explosive oscillations will occur if the impact of momentum 
traders ( e  ) is sufficiently large. The cycles in the model can be explained as follows. Suppose 
that initially the expected rate of return is sufficiently high. As a result, households increase their 
demand for equity. The higher the demand for equity the higher their price. This higher price 
increases the capital gains on equity and consequently the actual rate of return on equity. Since 
households have adaptive expectations about the expected rate of return on equity, the higher the 
actual rate of return the higher the expected rate of return on equity and, hence, the higher their 
demand for equity (i.e. the chartists dominate price formation). The equity-to-deposits ratio cannot 
increase continuously since there is imperfect asset substitution (households always wish to keep 
some deposits in their portfolio) and since households take into account the ‘fundamentals’. As a 
result, the increase in the equity-to-deposits ratio becomes small as the expected rate of return in 
equity is too high. Hence, the demand for equities and the return on equity gradually start declining. 
This asset price deflation process does not continue forever again because of the reference to the 
‘fundamentals’ and imperfect asset substitution. The new cycle begins when the expected rate of 
return starts increasing and becomes sufficiently high so as to induce a new rise in the equity-to-
deposits ratio. These dynamics of the model resemble the dynamics of Taylor and O’Connell (1985) 
in the case where there is high asset substitution and as a result the system becomes unstable.  
Chiarella and Di Guilmi (2011) propose a heterogeneous agents model that builds on and extends 
Taylor and O’Connell (1985) in several ways. On the financial side they allow investors to hold equity, 
debt and money as financial assets. They distinguish between two groups of firms, those with debt 
(called speculative firms) and those without debt (referred to as hedge firms). Firms invest 
depending on their equity price, which in turn depends on the expectations of future returns 
(demand or debt obligations have no impact on investment). These returns are determined by the 
composition of financial market actors. Chiarella and Di Guilmi (2011) distinguish between chartists 
and fundamentalists, whose relative shares are determined stochastically. Their use of the terms 
chartists and fundamentalists differ somewhat from the literature. Chartists value speculative firms 
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highly (but do not base evaluation on past experience) and fundamentalists value debt-free firms 
highly (but this valuation is not based on a fundamental value as conventionally defined). A high 
share of chartists drives up the prices of speculative firm equity; a high share of fundamentalists 
drives up the price of hedge firm equity. Equity prices, which drive investment, are the result of 
idiosyncratic shocks and the share of chartists. Firms produce with fixed coefficient production 
function (and infinitely elastic labour) and sell their output with a fixed mark-up. If profits fall below 
debt obligations, the firm goes bankrupt. New firms enter as a positive function of output growth. 
The model is discussed analytically by a mean-field analysis and simulated numerically. Chiarella and 
Di Guilmi (2011) report that the model matches firm stylised facts in terms of firm distributions and 
it exhibits cycles in output, equity prices, debt and bankruptcies. 
To sum up, in the equity price Minsky models the portfolio decision of households is introduced in 
order to analyse the destabilising role of the equity market. This portfolio decision does not exist in 
most debt or interest dynamics models. Households allocate their wealth between different assets, 
for example, between equity and deposits (Franke and Semmler, 1989; Ryoo, 2010, 2013a), between 
equity and money (Delli Gatti and Gallegati, 1990) or between equity, money and government bonds 
(Taylor and O’Connell, 1985), taking into account the relative rate of return of each asset. Instability 
and cycles typically emerge when households invest more in the equity market and as a result the 
rate of return on equity improves, inducing a further rise in the demand for equities. Ryoo (2010, 
2013a) and Chiarella and Di Guilmi (2011) introduce speculative dynamics by (explicitly or implicitly) 
distinguishing between fundamentalists and noise traders. This has feedback effects on economic 
activity since the resulting higher equity prices affect positively investment (via Tobin’s q or 
expectations) or consumption (via the wealth effect). There are some equity price Minsky models 
that have equity as residual source of finance (e.g. Ryoo, 2010, 2013a) and others where debt act as 
a residual (e.g. Chiarella and Di Guilmi, 2011). 
 
4.2 Real estate price Minsky models 
The real estate price Minsky models analyse housing debt, paying particular attention to the 
interaction between housing prices and collateral. The key real estate price Minsky model has been 
developed by Ryoo (2016).15 Housing prices in this model play a similar role as the stock prices in the 
equity price Minsky models. Firms finance their investment expenditures by issuing equity and by 
using their internal funds. They do not take out corporate debt. There are two types of households: 
workers and rentiers. Workers take on mortgages and invest in the housing market while rentier 
households invest in equities and deposits as in Ryoo (2013a). Banks provide mortgages to worker 
households taking into account their collateral. 
Following Ryoo (2010, 2013a, 2013b), Ryoo (2016) makes again a distinction between Kaldorian 
short cycles and financial long waves. The long waves are captured by a 3D system in which the state 
variables are workers’ housing wealth-to-capital ratio, the expected rate of return on houses and 
household debt-to-capital ratio. The housing wealth-to-capital ratio of workers ( wh ) and the 
expected rate of return on houses ( e ) change according to the following equations: 
                                                          
15 Zezza (2008) develops an SFC model with housing prices. However, he does not take explicitly into account 
Minskyan dynamics. 
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  wwew hcih    (25) 
 ee    (26) 
where wc  is workers’ household consumption-to-capital ratio,   is the (actual) rate of return on 
housing and   is a positive non-linear function of the expected rate of return on housing (i.e. 
0 e ). Equation (25) shows that workers’ desired housing wealth-to-consumption ratio, 
 ie  , is higher the higher is the expected rate of return on housing, e , compared to the 
interest rate on deposits (which is constant). The housing wealth-to-capital ratio increases when the 
desired housing wealth-to-capital ratio is higher than the actual wealth-to-capital ratio. Equation 
(26) shows that the expected rate of return on housing changes via an adaptive expectations 
mechanism. The third state variable of the 3D system, the debt-to-capital ratio, is positively affected 
by workers’ household net income and their net worth. 
In this system instability is more likely when credit supply is highly responsive to the value of 
collateral, the sensitivity of housing supply to prices is low and the demand for houses is highly 
sensitive to expected capital gains. The cycles produced are similar to the cycles in the equity price 
Minsky models. Note that even with a constant debt-to-capital ratio it is possible to get cycles in the 
wh  and e  space. In this case the cycles can be described as follows. An increase in the expected 
housing price inflation produces a higher demand for houses. This gives a boost to housing prices 
and increases the actual rate of return on houses. Similarly to the equity price Minsky models, 
worker households have adaptive expectations about the expected rate of return on houses. As a 
result, the higher the actual rate of return on houses the higher the expected rate of return on 
houses. This brings about a boost to the demand for houses. At some point, workers’ housing 
wealth-to-capital ratio stops increasing since households do not want to have a housing wealth-to-
consumption rate above a specific upper limit. At this point, workers’ desired housing wealth-to-
capital ratio and the expected rate of return on houses start decreasing. This does not continue 
forever since households always want to invest a proportion of their net wealth in houses. When wh  
and e  become sufficiently low a new cycle begins where the expected rate of return on houses and 
workers’ housing wealth-to-capital ratio start increasing again. 
In the case in which the debt-to-capital ratio changes in an endogenous way the increase in housing 
prices gives a boost to the value of the collateral. The higher the value of the collateral the higher 
the credit provision by banks. At some point, the debt payment commitments become sufficiently 
high, decreasing loan expansion and consequently the debt-to-capital ratio. 
 
5. Mainstream Minsky models 
Recently, there have been several attempts to incorporate Minskyan ideas into mainstream 
economic frameworks. By mainstream we mean models that insist on explicit microfoundations and, 
in the area of macroeconomics, use Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models as the 
key reference point. Bhattacharya et al. (2015) present a model of financial markets where investors 
can choose between a risky and a safe asset. The payout from these assets depends on whether the 
economy is in a good or a bad state. Investors and bankers update their forecasts based on past 
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experience. In a bad state investors may default on their loans, which results in some deadweight 
loss. Bankers extend loans and charge interest on it based on the expected default rates and costs. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2015) demonstrate that competitive market outcomes are suboptimal as 
investors do not take into account the externalities of their default, i.e. the deadweight loss and the 
risk premium effects of their defaults, because they are price takers on credit markets. The paper 
has explicit reference to Minsky and its novelty is in the explicit modelling of defaults. It neither 
demonstrates the existence of endogenous cycles, nor is it concerned with the macroeconomic 
effects of financial dynamics.  
Farmer (2013) incorporates some Minskyan features into a rational expectations model with search 
of unemployment. His model is a multiple equilibrium model, where a belief function (also referred 
to as ‘animal spirits’) allows rational actors to choose between a continuum of possible equilibria. 
The belief function effectively determines the labour supply of the model and changes in animal 
spirits are thus transmitted (in proper New Classical fashion) via labour supply shocks. The main 
strength of the model is that animal spirits shocks have permanent labour market effects. Debt and 
financial fragility do not play a role in Farmer’s model, nor is investment a key variable.  
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) build a model with two types of agents, which differ by their rate of 
time preference. The impatient agents will thus borrow from the patient ones. The model imposes 
an upper limit to borrowing and the main part of the paper discusses how in the case of an 
exogenous shock to the borrowing limit, the model exhibits Keynesian features like large multipliers 
and debt deflation problems. In a large deleveraging shock the AD curve can become upwards 
sloping and more flexible labour market will mean a larger output reduction. The paper 
demonstrates that in a deleveraging economy the Keynesian features will be strong; it has a 
prominent role for debt, but it does not discuss endogenous cycles. The main actors are households, 
not businesses. Overall these models are attempts to incorporate some of Minsky’s arguments in an 
optimisation framework, but they do not fulfil Minsky’s ambition to analyse endogenous real-
financial dynamics.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has suggested a categorisation of Minsky-inspired models. While Minsky had been an 
obscure economist for much of his life, since the mid 1980s there has been a growing literature on 
the formalisation of his arguments. This paper has surveyed the existing Minsky models highlighting 
their key differences and similarities. Our categorisation makes a broad distinction between the 
models that focus on the dynamics of debt or interest, with no or a secondary role for asset prices, 
and the models in which asset prices play a key role in the dynamic behaviour of the economy. 
Within the debt or interest dynamics models debt typically behaves procyclically and exerts a 
negative effect on demand. We made a distinction between the Kalecki-Minsky models that assume 
a stable goods market, the Kaldor-Minsky models which postulate instability in the goods market 
and the Goodwin-Minsky models that incorporate debt dynamics into the traditional Goodwin 
interactions between the wage share and employment rate. We also analysed the credit rationing 
Minsky models, in which credit provision depends on banks’ financial position, and the endogenous 
target debt ratio Minsky models, which are driven by the stock-flow norms of the private sector that 
change endogenously during the economic cycle. The Minsky-Veblen models combine consumer 
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debt with the Veblenian ideas of emulation motives. Unlike the previous models this last group is 
about household debt rather than corporate debt. Within the asset price models, we distinguished 
between (i) the equity price Minsky models that analyse the cycles and the instability that arise from 
the dynamics of equity prices and (ii) the real estate price Minsky models that study the dynamic 
interaction between mortgages and housing prices.  
Our survey has focused on theoretical models, but it is the case that the Minsky literature so far has 
concentrated on theoretical modelling and there is only a handful of rigorous empirical papers (e.g. 
Schroeder, 2009; Mulligan, 2013; Nishi, 2016; Davis et al., 2017) which often focus on specific 
mechanisms (such as the pro-cyclical debt ratio) rather than testing the models discussed in this 
survey. There are four sets of questions that follow from this survey: What are the main points of 
differences between the Minsky models? Are they complementary or competing? What has been 
missing in the literature and what are its limitations? What are the implications for future research? 
Different authors develop Minsky’s arguments in a variety of different ways, both in terms of the key 
mechanisms involved and in terms of what is to be explained. In particular, some authors are eager 
to demonstrate that local instability can emerge without paying attention to the global properties of 
the models, while others want to demonstrate the emergence of endogenous cycles. Both the debt 
or interest dynamics models and the asset price dynamics models analyse the interaction between 
the real sector and the financial sector, but one important difference is that the asset price dynamics 
models can generate pure financial cycles. Moreover, the models covered differ in their investment 
functions, in the source of residual finance, in the key financial variables that matter and in the 
sector that is vulnerable to financial fragility. As regards the investment function the distinction 
between Kaleckian and Kaldorian models is whether investment is overshooting with respect to 
demand; many of the models discussed have interest payments (or retained earnings) impacting on 
investment, whereas in the endogenous target debt ratio models investment is affected by the 
target ratios which capture perceived uncertainty; in asset price dynamics models equity prices have 
a direct impact on investment. Models also differ on whether debt or equity issue is regarded as the 
main source of residual finance. Debt dynamics models lend themselves more to credit as the 
residual source of finance while asset price dynamics may lend themselves to equity as residual 
source of finance; however there is no one to one pairing. As regards the household debt models, 
the Minsky-Veblen models and the real estate price models differ on whether consumption 
emulation or wealth effects are the main drivers of debt accumulation.  
What are the limitations of the Minskyan models analysed in this review? A first limitation is that 
there is no common framework of analysis. Some authors assume away asset prices, others pay 
scant attention to debt. We do note that the debt or interest dynamics literature has so far not 
incorporated asset prices explicitly, whereas several of the asset price dynamics models do explicitly 
model debt. An increasing number of authors does use SFC models and thus are explicit on the links 
between financial stocks and flows. As of now there are few heterogeneous agents models and 
those that exist have only weakly developed demand sides. However, for the most part, the different 
arguments are not necessarily mutually exclusive. While the Kaleckian and the Kaldorian investment 
functions are mutually exclusive, debt cycles and asset prices cycles are not exclusive, nor are 
endogenous debt norms and asset price speculation. However, attempts to synthesise the 
arguments will soon hit the limits of tractability. Thus, to make progress and keep models 
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manageable it will be important to identify which mechanisms matter most in practise or clarify the 
conditions under which certain models are applicable. 
A second limitation is that, the link between the empirical literature and the theoretical models is 
loose. The vast majority of the authors make no attempt to estimate econometrically the key 
equations of their models or to calibrate the models in order to produce the patterns observed in 
the real data. Also, among the models discussed only Ryoo (2010, 2013a, 2013b, 2016) asks how real 
cycles and Minsky cycles interact (Ryoo regards the financial cycles as long waves, but argues that 
business cycles are due to real factors).  
Overall, Minskyans have made substantial progress in developing and formalising Minsky’s rich 
ideas. Future research should make a concerted effort to confront Minsky models with empirical 
data ─ both in the sense of testing the different mechanisms and evaluating their relative 
importance, but also in terms of calibrating the models and clarifying what the periodicity and the 
amplitude of the cycles is. 
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Figure 1. Families of Minsky models 
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Table 1. Key differences and similarities between the families of Minsky models 
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